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I. THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION DEBATE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
During the waning years of the Bush Administration, the Republican
President and the Democratic Congress attempted different legislative solu-
tions to help comprehensively repair our broken immigration system. Cen-
tral to negotiations between a bipartisan Senate bill and a Republican-backed
House bill was the question of how to resolve the status of the estimated
eight to twelve million undocumented persons already in the United States
and prevent future visa overstays or unauthorized border crossings.1 Marches
reminiscent of the Civil Rights Movement broke out in cities across the na-
* Although I acknowledge that not all readers are U.S. citizens, the use of the word “our”
deliberately links the actions of the founding fathers to current residents as a way of
interrogating contemporary American immigration policy.
** Maureen B. Cavanaugh Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn
State; vcr1@psu.edu.  I’d like to thank my wonderful wife, Corie Phillips Romero, for her
terrific insights and feedback on a different version of this piece, Ben Babcock for his helpful
research on Washington and Allen, and Dean Phil McConnaughay for his support of all my
work. I also appreciate the critical eye of the editors of the Harvard Latino Law Review for
their careful review, which further improved this piece. Thanks, as always, to my family in the
Philippines and Singapore, and my children, Ryan, Julia, and Matthew, for reminding me daily
about what’s truly important in life. All errors that remain are mine alone.
1 Rachel L. Swarns, Senate, in Bipartisan Act, Passes an Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/washington/26immig.html?_r=1.
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tion, with thousands forcefully claiming their right to remain in a country
they helped shape through their industry in the fields, maquiladoras,2 con-
struction sites, and urban esquinitas.3
Around the same time, a satirical YouTube video of a cartoon called
“The Great Immigration Debate of 1621” went viral.4 It depicted an Ameri-
can Indian tribal council meeting in which the members debated what to do
about the mass influx of Pilgrims fleeing religious persecution in England.5
At the evening gathering, all sides in the debate were aired – “Build a wall;”
“Welcome [the newcomers as] good for the economy;” “Treat them with
respect;” “Exclude them all as dangers to our way of life;” and so on.6 The
next morning, the Chief announced a new immigration policy: All uninvited
migrants would be considered “illegals” and could be sent back at any time,
and all illegals had to register with the new Guest Indian Program.7 After
“living in harmony with the land for at least six years,” illegals would be
eligible for a “junior scout card” that they would then need to present at all
public places.8 The Pilgrims were unsurprisingly outraged by the new policy
and staged a mass protest, declaring their basic human right to live and work
in the New World.9
This video has been viewed over three million times10 because it satiri-
cally and succinctly captures the inherent tension in any immigration deci-
sion that weighs the interests of a sovereign power in securing its borders
against its desire to welcome newcomers. A cartoon gracing the November
28, 2011 cover of the New Yorker likewise depicted Pilgrims sneaking across
what looks like the U.S.-Mexico border.11 By placing our European fore-
bears in the role of migrants rather than policymakers, the video and the
2 A “maquiladora” is a “manufacturing plant that imports and assembles duty-free com-
ponents for export,” creating tax advantages for plant owners by employing low-cost labor
whose production is subject only to value-added duties. See Encyclopedia Britannica, “Ma-
quiladora,” available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/363663/maquiladora
(last accessed Nov. 19, 2012).
3 Rachel L. Swarns, Immigrants Rally in Scores of Cities for Legal Status, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/11/us/11immig.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
From the Spanish for “little corners,” “esquinitas” refer to the street corners of our nation’s
cities, where day laborers patiently wait to be picked up by small business owners and individ-
uals.  Some progressive cities, like Los Angeles, have created formal day laborer programs in
an effort to streamline and regularize the process, benefiting both employer and laborer. See
Day Laborer Program, CITY OF LOS ANGELES, http://cdd.lacity.org/emp_empday.html (last
accessed Nov. 19, 2012).
4 Current, Supernews!: The Great Immigration Debate: Supernews!, YOUTUBE (May 3,
2006) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhEl6HdfqWM.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Christoph Niemann, The Promised Land, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 2011, at Cover.
Christoph Niemann writes of his cartoon, “I draw a parallel between current immigrants and
early settlers—the hope is that it will provide context, to help keep things in perspective.
Cartoonists, not politicians, should be the ones who condense political discussions into simple
images.”  Mina Kaneko & Franc¸oise Mouly, Cover Story: Promised Land, THE NEW YORKER,
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cartoon wryly point out that, but for their successful conquest, Europeans
could well have been excluded by a stringent anti-illegal immigration policy
that eerily parallels some state anti-immigration laws that have recently been
enacted.12 The video and the New Yorker cartoon both oversimplify the com-
plex relationship between diverse American Indian tribes and equally di-
verse European migrants, but they highlight the fact that the U.S.
government and its policies do not adequately represent all the interests of
its diverse people.
Of course, the Indians were not a unified nation but were as diverse a
group of tribes as were the European settlers; indeed, both groups sometimes
spent much time bickering and fighting amongst themselves rather than
against each other.  Some might argue, therefore, that the video is a poor
parody at best – that its oversimplification of the complex relationships be-
tween diverse Indian tribes and equally diverse European migrants provides
a weak parallel to our current federal government’s struggles with border
policy in the twenty-first century.  Yet, it would be equally simplistic to as-
sume that the United States government and its policies adequately represent
the true interests of its diverse people.  As historian Howard Zinn notes:
The pretense is that there really is such a thing as “the United
States,” subject to occasional conflicts and quarrels, but funda-
mentally a community of people with common interests.  It is as if
there is a ‘national interest’ represented in the Constitution, in ter-
ritorial expansion, in the laws passed by Congress, the decisions of
the courts, the development of capitalism, the culture of education
and the mass media.13
Perhaps our best rejoinder to Zinn is that in the immigration context, the
federal government aims to create a coherent policy that puts our nation and
its citizens first, though U.S. citizens might quibble with their representa-
tives as to whether they got the answer right. Because U.S. citizens’ interests
take precedence over noncitizens’ interests, and because the nation takes pre-
cedence over the individual, any immigration policy will, on balance, favor
the natives over the migrants, whether the present-day Latinos or the Pil-
grims of yesteryear.
Thus, the most vexing question arising out of the current immigration
debate – and that of 1621 – is:  How should the government regulate the
flow of migrants across our borders?  Related, though subsidiary, questions
include: How do we determine where our borders begin and end?  What
consequences – civil or criminal – should attend a border breach?  When, if
Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/culture/2011/11/cover-
story-christoph-niemann.html.
12 See, e.g., New American Media, Immigrants Prepare for Increased Threats Under
“Show Me Your Papers” Enforcement, Sept. 19, 2012, available at http://newamericamedia.
org/2012/09/immigrants-prepare-for-increased-threats-under-show-me-your-papers-enforce
ment.php (describing immigrants’ reactions to the recent spate of state anti-immigration laws).
13 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 9 (1995).
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ever, might there be exceptions to these consequences?  Our answers to
these difficult questions may depend on which group we tend to identify
with: the U.S. citizens the law aims to privilege or the newcomers the law
simultaneously wishes to welcome.  Current restrictionist legislators who
favor more stringent border security coupled with equally strict interior en-
forcement might think twice about their positions if they took a moment to
hypothesize an America in which their forebears were similarly
marginalized.
This Essay briefly mines America’s history from before the Founding
through the mid-twentieth century to argue that the law setting forth where
our national borders are and how strictly we patrol them has always been
subject to the vagaries of politics, economics, and perception. Illegal
(im)migration has long been part of our migration history, engaged in not
just by Latin American border-crossers or Asian overstays, but also by
prominent colonists, giving the lie to the claim that upholding border laws
should always be sacrosanct.  In many school districts today, the usual sum-
mary of American history from our childhood civics classes no longer by-
passes the uncomfortable truths of conquest and westward expansion by
Anglo-Protestant settlers to the detriment of American Indians and Mexi-
cans.  However, not often is this story described as a parable of illegal immi-
gration.  This Essay recounts the prominent role illegal immigration played
in America’s prehistory.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF (IL)LEGAL IMMIGRATION
A. Private Borders, National Borders, and the Role of Law
Boundaries and borders have long been a fixture of western communal
existence.  Prior to the advent of modern mapping, “boundary stones”
marked the private borders in the American frontier, a practice English sur-
veyors likely imported to this country.14  Though they occasionally coincided
with a natural, physical border like a river, these boundaries were a legal
creation designed to demarcate private property ownership. As Powell on
Real Property, a leading treatise, explains:
A boundary exists because the law permits it to exist, yet one can-
not feel it, touch it, or see it; it is not in any way manifested by a
dimension.  Yet once it becomes created, it has legal authority.
One neighbor cannot cross over a neighbor’s boundary without be-
ing in trespass, and possibly being responsible for damages.15
Whether under the common law of property, tort, or crime, American law
has long protected against trespass both to preserve the economic interests of
14 CURTIS M. BROWN, WALTER G. ROBILLARD, & DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUND-
ARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 3 (4th ed. 1995).
15 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, vol. 16, § 91.01[2] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2005).
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the landowner and to keep the peace between disputants. Interestingly, the
law also allowed trespassers rights over or to the land whose borders they
breached if the landholder expressed apparent consent, whether explicitly or
by abandonment, for instance.16 First-year law students recall the ancient and
rather curious doctrine of “adverse possession,” the idea that if one openly
occupies another’s property for a specified time period, the squatter’s rights
supersede the owner’s.
Like setting borders between private individuals, immigration law can
be seen as a government’s attempt to order boundaries between nations and
their citizens, on a much larger, public scale. United States immigration law
has often been described as a set of rules premised on the distinction be-
tween U.S. citizens and noncitizens, thereby governing when noncitizens
may enter the United States, under what conditions, and when they must
leave.17  The U.S. must consider what consequences befall noncitizens who
run afoul of immigration laws – are they to be treated like criminals, or will
their transgressions be viewed as civil infractions only?  Of course, with
rules come possible exceptions: Are there times when, even if a person has
no documents to enter, she may be allowed to remain?  What if she is mar-
ried to a U.S. citizen?  What if she has important national security informa-
tion to disclose to U.S. authorities?  What if she is a successful entrepreneur
who desires to open a new business that will bring hundreds of jobs to native
workers?  What if she is fleeing persecution in her home country?  And if
exceptions effectively excuse a border breach, what does this mean for pre-
serving the integrity of the border?
B. The Malleable Border in U.S. History
The complexity of ordering the rules, consequences, and exceptions in
formulating U.S. immigration and border policy has long been influenced by
economics, politics, and perception.  Laws (or exceptions excusing their
breach) have long favored the powerful, and border laws have not been im-
mune from this.  While contemporary debates about border security appear
to be fixed upon our southern border with Mexico, before the founding of
the United States, border disputes within the pre-United States were internal:
between colonists and colonies, between the Indian nations and the colonies,
between the English and French colonial masters, and so on.18 Instead of the
current concern over the northern movement of peoples from the south,
much of the early history of America involved the westward expansion of
the country, coinciding with the revolution against England.19
16 JESSE DUKERMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, & MICHAEL H. SCHILL,
PROPERTY 116 (7th ed. 2010).
17 VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS 5 (2009).
18 See generally THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1959).
19 Id.
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1. Privilege and Power during the 1700s: Our “Illegal” Founding
Fathers20
Perhaps unsurprisingly, England set colonial boundaries throughout its
American holdings; perhaps even less surprisingly, the colonies and colonial
leaders would challenge both the English and each other over where borders
were set.21  Following the French and Indian War of the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, several of our most prominent founders were engaged in what might be
termed “illegal immigration” today – they would disregard borders set forth
by governmental authorities, sometimes through subterfuge and legal machi-
nations, and sometimes through force.22  To be clear, this discussion is not
intended to diminish these founders or their contributions; indeed, many
others engaged in these unauthorized border crossing ventures as well.
Rather, the point is to remind us that the economic factors that motivate
many faceless unfortunates to travel to the United States today were the
same factors that prompted their more famous ancestors to cross into forbid-
den or disputed territories in colonial America.
Let’s consider the case of George Washington, the first President of the
United States and a first-rate military commander and leader.23  Having
served the Crown with distinction during Britain’s Ohio Country skirmishes
against the French in the 1750s, Washington returned to Mount Vernon to
take his place among Virginia’s civilian gentry.24  Because of his early trav-
els as a young surveyor and then as a military man, Washington had his eye
on what many other colonial elites desired at the time: acquiring lands west
of his Virginia home.25  Unlike other modern speculators, Washington did
not acquire land for future resale, but instead intended it to remain in the
family.26  Unfortunately, Washington’s overweening ambition led him to
cross legal and ethical boundaries in his quest for ever more western
property.
In 1763, King George III issued a proclamation that set the boundaries
of British colonial rule along the Appalachians from modern-day Maine to
Georgia, reserving all land west of that area to American Indian tribes.27
Washington had little regard for the proclamation, viewing it as “a tempo-
20 This is a play on a New York Times article that alerted me to this history, William
Hogeland, Our Founding Illegals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2006/12/27/opinion/27hogeland.html (describing George Washington’s and Ethan
Allen’s illegal westward land grab).
21 Id.; see also JOHN PELL, ETHAN ALLEN 28-30 (1929).
22 Hogeland, supra note 20.
23 For a thoroughgoing discussion of Washington’s formative period and his land acquisi-
tion exploits, see ROBERT F. JONES, GEORGE WASHINGTON 30-41 (rev. ed. 1986); JOSEPH J.
ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 42-72 (2004).
24 JONES, supra note 23, at 18-30.
25 ELLIS, supra note 23, at 55.
26 JONES, supra note 23, at 30. Interestingly, Washington never obtained the riches he
desired through land ownership; the War of Independence and his own participation in nation
building interrupted his aspirations to land baronage. Id. at 31.
27 ELLIS, supra note 23, at 55.
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rary expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians [that] must fall of course in
a few years especially when those Indians are consenting to our Occupying
the Lands.”28  Despite his use of the word “consent,” Washington thought it
was only a matter of time before white settlers took over the western Indian
lands by force or threat of force, a natural outgrowth of the English victory
in the French and Indian War.29  Washington attached no moral significance
to this “manifest destiny,” viewing America’s westward expansion as inevi-
table.  As such, Washington believed the Proclamation to be either naı¨ve for
discounting this inevitability, or underhanded if London had planned to re-
serve the western lands to the British, leaving the colonists only the eastern
seaboard.30 Washington’s letter to his agent, William Crawford, supports this
reading:
Any person therefore who neglects the present opportunity of
hunting out good Lands and in some measure marking and distin-
guishing them for their own (in order to keep others from settling
them) will never regain it, if therefore you will be at the trouble of
seeking out the Lands I will take upon me the part of securing
them as soon as there is a possibility of doing it . . . . By this time,
it may be easy for you to discover, that my Plan is to secure a good
deal of Land.31
Later on in the letter, Washington cautions Crawford not to disclose Wash-
ington’s view of the King’s Proclamation, advising instead that Crawford
proceed “snugly under the pretence of hunting other Game . . . and leave the
rest to time and my own Assiduity to Accomplish.”32
At first blush, the letter might charitably be viewed as poor support for
the view that Washington was planning to engage in an illegal border cross-
ing.  After all, expressing disagreement with a law does not violate it, nor
does informally surveying the land perfect title in it.  Yet, Washington in-
sisted that Crawford mark the land to prevent others from claiming it despite
the fact that the Proclamation forbade western settlement.  As Joseph Ellis
summarized the conflict over the Ohio Country’s legal status, “Washington
believed it was open to settlement; the British government believed it was
closed; and the Indians believed it was theirs.”33
Washington’s next move was to explore possible loopholes in the Proc-
lamation. In 1754, then Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie had issued an
order allotting 200,000 acres of bounty land to those who enlisted in the
French and Indian War. The 1763 Proclamation, while specifically forbid-
28 ABERNETHY, supra note 18, at 69 (quoting Letter from George Washington to William
Crawford (Sept. 21, 1767)).
29 Id.
30 ELLIS, supra note 23, at 55.
31 ABERNETHY, supra note 18, at 69 (quoting Letter from George Washington to William
Crawford (Sept. 21, 1767)).
32 Id.
33 ELLIS, supra note 23, at 55.
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ding western settlement, simultaneously announced a grant of 5,000 acres to
each veteran who served until the end of the war. Washington was clearly
ineligible for the 5,000 acres, since he did not serve until the war’s end,
resigning his commission in 1758.  Instead, he organized a committee to
claim the Dinwiddie bounty, selecting a peninsula along the Ohio and Great
Kanawha rivers and eventually claiming 20,147 of the 200,000 acres of
choice land for himself, with the enlisted men receiving only 400 acres
each.34
The legality of this action was questionable in two ways.  First, the
language of the Dinwiddie order strongly suggested that the shares be given
to enlisted men only, and Washington was an officer – a colonel who had
received 5,000 acres through this order and who had purchased many more
acres of land from those uninterested in redeeming their shares. Moreover,
Virginia law forbade anyone from reserving the richest, most fertile portions
of the land to himself, as Washington did.  Second, the 1763 Proclamation
arguably voided all his western land claims within the Ohio Country; the
British proclamation of 1763 would have superseded the later Virginia Din-
widdie bounty of 1754. Yet Washington did not view his acquisitions as
either illegal or unethical, but rather as a fair share for his initiative in or-
ganizing the Ohio Country expedition. Indeed, Washington even questioned
the enforceability of the 1763 Proclamation in light of the reality of the colo-
nists’ westward expansion. His actions were no different from those of other
Virginia planters; Washington was simply more determined and diligent than
his contemporaries. Washington’s response to the Proclamation “was to re-
gard the British policies as superfluous and to act on the assumption that, in
the end, no one could stop him.”35  Washington’s reaction to the Proclama-
tion serves to elucidate the notion that boundaries are malleable and subject
to changing laws and attitudes.
My point here is not to impugn George Washington’s integrity nor dis-
honor his memory, but simply to point out the historical malleability of bor-
ders.  George Washington was undoubtedly a great man, but his avaricious
land grab in defiance of then-existing rules is less than noble.  Washington
crossed borders in pursuit of personal enrichment and in defiance of British
(and indeed, Virginia) law.  Still, this transgression usually warrants little
discussion in light of the overwhelming evidence of Washington’s enormous
contributions to the nation’s founding.  This vignette from Washington’s life
reminds us that legal borders and the laws that recognize them are not per-
manent boundaries that follow fixed, natural, physical limits, but are instead
man-made creations of governments that should be subject to reflection and
reassessment.
The story of Ethan Allen, another early patriot perhaps best
remembered for leading the capture of Fort Ticonderoga during the Ameri-
can Revolutionary War, offers similar evidence of the pliability of American
34 JONES, supra note 23, at 34-35.
35 ELLIS, supra note 23, at 56-57.
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borders and the contemporary debate around undocumented migration.  As
with George Washington, history generally regards Ethan Allen as an early
patriot, although a closer examination of Allen’s illicit border-crossing activ-
ity (and his violent defense thereof) offers similar lessons for our study of
the pliability of American borders and the contemporary debate around un-
documented migration.
The colonial borders of the British northeast provinces were murky at
best. For many years, overlapping royal charters and inaccurate surveys fu-
eled disputes among the nascent states, with Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire all controlling lands already claimed by New York.
New Hampshire’s governor, Benning Wentworth, was particularly bold and
greedy, extending his colony’s borders in 1749 into uncharted acreage as far
west of the Connecticut River as possible without running into established
New York settlements. The ensuing border dispute between the two colonies
ran for fifteen years, with Wentworth occupying the land pursuant to an am-
biguous royal charter and then taking advantage of the British government’s
slow resolution of the claims, as well as delays occasioned by the French and
Indian War. New York had the last laugh, however, as the king awarded it
the disputed lands in the Proclamation of July 20, 1764, prompting
Wentworth’s resignation as governor. New York then granted these newly
acquired lands aggressively, though no towns were established and settlers
were few. As with other rulings, the king’s proclamation was not enforced,
leading to the New Hampshire settlers’ resistance to the New Yorkers’
claims.36
It is into this legal and political thicket that Ethan Allen entered the fray
on New Hampshire’s side against New York.  Unlike the absentee New
Yorkers, the New Hampshire grantees who purchased Governor Wentworth’s
(fraudulent) titles settled the lands in earnest. As one settler, Timothy
Dwight, put it, “[e]very planter went upon his farm . . . with a full convic-
tion that no change was to be expected in his civil concerns.”37 Ethan Allen
was no different; while some engaged in speculation and resale, Allen set-
tled his land as part of the approximately 12,000 people who populated what
became known as the New Hampshire Grants between 1763 and 1775.38
Once New Yorkers began to lay claim to the Grants under the 1764 Procla-
mation, the New Hampshire settlers procured a 1767 decree from the king
prohibiting the New York governor from issuing new land grants until he
could review the matter further.39 Civil suits erupted, pitting the New York
claimants against the New Hampshire settlers.40  This left the New Hamp-
36 This episode is described in great detail in MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, REVOLUTIONARY
OUTLAWS: ETHAN ALLEN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE ON THE EARLY AMERICAN
FRONTIER 30-32 (1993). See also PELL, supra note 21, at 28-30.
37 BELLESILES, supra note 36, at 32.
38 Id. at 33.
39 PELL, supra note 21, at 29.
40 Id. at 29–32.
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shire settlers little legal recourse but to form a resistance militia, the Green
Mountain Boys.41
Though widely regarded as a patriot for leading the capture of Fort Ti-
conderoga during the American Revolutionary War, Allen is less well-
known for heading the Green Mountain Boys, New Hampshire grantees all,
in their often violent campaign to expel legal New York titleholders from the
Grants.42  Historian John Pell describes Allen and his gang’s lawlessness in
resisting New York landlords’ efforts to survey the land:  “When [Allen]
came upon surveyors running lines in the forest, he set up a ‘Judgment Seat’
under some huge, old pine tree, tried them on the spot, and often had them
stripped and whipped, calling the punishment ‘Chastisement with the Twigs
of the Wilderness.’” 43  One older New Yorker, John Munro, was “taken,
tried, and ordered to be whipped on his naked back.  He was tied to a tree
and flogged till he fainted; on recovering, he was whipped again till he
fainted; he underwent a third lashing till he fainted; his wounds were then
dressed and he was banished from the district of the New Hampshire
Grants.”44  Allen and the Green Mountain Boys served as the proverbial
judge, jury, and executioner of any hapless New Yorkers, including sheriffs,
who dared to assert their legal rights over the Grants.45  Indeed, in Allen’s
view, the New York landlords were officious intermeddlers, sowing where
they did not reap: “Can the New York scribblers, by the art of printing alter
wrong into right, or make any person of good sense believe that a great
number of hard labouring peasants, going through the fatigues of settlement,
and cultivation of a howling wilderness, are a community of riotous, disor-
derly, licentious, treasonable persons?”46
Like Washington, Allen did not let the law stand in the way of his
desire to acquire land and cross borders.  It mattered not that the New Hamp-
shire Grants were illegally obtained, nor that the Crown ruled in New York’s
favor regarding this land; Allen and the Green Mountain Boys appeared to
assert their rights by virtue of having occupied and developed the land first.
So convinced were they of their claims that they were willing to defend their
settlements with physical force, even against law enforcement officers.
One might attempt to defend Allen by questioning the wisdom of the
Crown’s decision to side with New York against the New Hampshire grant-
ees. After all, it was Governor Wentworth, not the grantees, who sold fraud-
ulent titles, and New Hampshire residents physically settled the land more
often than absentee New York titleholders.47  Still, even if one sympathized
with the New Hampshire grantees, it is difficult to condone the use of extra-
legal force to physically thwart the New Yorkers. Allen and his associates
41 Id. at 33.
42 BELLESILES, supra note 36, at 33, 94.
43 PELL, supra note 21, at 35.
44 Id. at 36.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 44.
47 See id. at 29.
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could have proceeded within existing legal and political channels rather than
staging elaborate pseudo-trials ending in corporal punishment for the ac-
cused.48  Just as Washington overreached by claiming western territory to
which he had questionable legal right, Allen defended borders illegally
breached by the New Hampshire grantees and used excessive, extralegal
force to do so.
Though these vignettes illustrate the malleability of borders, they do not
detract from the role each man played in founding the United States. Soci-
ety’s collective “amnesia” when it comes to our heroes is not unique – for
instance, that Washington had African slaves is common knowledge – but in
thinking about what constitutes an illegal border crossing, one has to remem-
ber that society’s perception of an illegal act might often be viewed in a
context that goes beyond evaluating legal niceties, instead placing the act
within the framework of the transgressor’s larger historical role.
As such, most Americans will have little trouble relegating these vi-
gnettes to the historical dustbin – they are interesting tidbits about Washing-
ton and Allen, but they do not diminish the stature of either great man.  And
that would be a fair assessment – a man’s life should not be measured by a
single illegal act, but should be viewed in the context of his entire life.  The
theme of “redemption” similarly informs this Essay:  Like our illegal foun-
ders, illegal border crossers today should not be irredeemably vilified be-
cause of their one desperate act, but rather their transgressions should be
weighed against the full scope of their lives.  Instead, so much of the current
discourse about undocumented migration focuses on the illegality of the mi-
grant’s act – the unauthorized border crossing or overstay – rather than on
the individual’s subsequent contributions.
2. The View from Below: “Illegal” People in the New Republic49
Often, history’s and society’s assessment of a man’s life depends on not
just the individual life itself, but on whether that life was lived as part of a
privileged and powerful elite.  In contrast to our founding fathers’ interesting
but relatively irrelevant border crossing adventures, confining certain minor-
ity groups to real or figurative borders became a crucial feature of much of
our early American history.  American Indians and Mexicans, African
slaves, Asian laborers, and European immigrants all found themselves on the
outside looking in, their cultural differences perceived as barriers to building
the Anglo-Protestant vision of a new “city on a hill.”
While seeking to expand its borders westward, the burgeoning nation
also increasingly sought to shield its shores against foreign incursion
through state and federal immigration restrictions.  For George Washington,
Ethan Allen, and their ilk, the expulsion of the British and the acquisition of
48 BELLESILES, supra note 36, at 94.
49 See generally JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007).
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new land during the mid- to late-1700s were a breath of fresh air, the begin-
nings of a great nation liberated from the shackles of oppressive European
masters. However, from the perspective of many others, this glorious expan-
sion wrought exploitation and exclusion during the 1800s, leading to the
displacement of American Indians and Mexicans from their homelands.
This story begins in the 1800s, not too long after independence in 1776,
from the perspective of those whose borders were breached: the racial and
ethnic minority groups who had no choice in the legal policies and cultural
restrictions placed on their free movement either within, or into, these new
United States.
Not surprisingly, the English elites that comprised the political and eco-
nomic upper-class in eighteenth and nineteenth century America adopted the
same outlook of cultural superiority that their British forebears had, and di-
rected this toward the non-English.  Immigrants themselves, who in their
Declaration of Independence from England asserted the equality of all men
and their universal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the
Anglo-Protestant majority nonetheless ignored American Indian land claims,
exploited African, Chinese, and Mexican labor, and limited immigration to
those whom they believed were most like them.
American racism is by no means unique and can be traced back to its
continental roots. During the Age of Discovery, European colonizers justi-
fied their expeditions abroad as a means for civilizing native “savages” and,
in the case of the Spanish particularly, saving their souls through Catholic
conversion.50  It is no wonder then that the American aristocracy of the
1700s and 1800s inherited the same worldview.51
Thus, notwithstanding the appeals to equality espoused in the Declara-
tion of Independence, the upshot of this perspective was that borders –
whether legal or social – were erected by the Anglo-Protestant majority to
the detriment of the racial and ethnic minorities whose rights were con-
strained and circumscribed accordingly.
a. Westward Expansion: Displacement and Discrimination
Despite its newfound political independence from Britain, the fledgling
United States struggled to wean itself economically from its former master,
find a suitable balance between federal power and state sovereignty (often
defined by the debate over African slavery), and negotiate a fair-minded
approach toward the American Indian nations, many of whom fought on the
English side during the Revolutionary War. Echoing the border-crossing
ventures of Washington and Allen, the federal government pursued west-
ward expansion as the domestic version of its European forebears’ coloniz-
ing efforts abroad. With the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from France, Thomas
50 See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (describing Spanish, English, and Early
American principles justifying the subjugation of indigenous peoples and their lands).
51 See generally PEREA, supra note 49, at 140.
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Jefferson’s administration doubled the size of the United States, significantly
expanding arable land available for the growing number of European immi-
grants seeking to move out of the largely settled Atlantic colonies, as well as
offering a place to resettle American Indian nations still remaining in the
east.
While the new Constitution established federal treaty power with the
American Indians52 and Jefferson’s hope was for voluntary resettlement
through assimilation and negotiation,53 pressure on the federal government
from an increasing number of European immigrant settlers led to forcible
removal and displacement when the tribes ceased to voluntarily sell and
relocate.54  Ironically, even when American Indians chose to sell their land to
private individuals according to native traditions, such title was not recog-
nized in U.S. courts, per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson v. McIn-
tosh.55  As historian Francis Paul Prucha put it, “The goal of American
statesmen was the orderly advance of the frontier. . . . But if the goal was an
orderly advance, it was nevertheless advance of the frontier, and in the pro-
cess of reconciling the two elements, conflict and injustice were often the
result.”56
Mexicans also suffered collateral damage from the nation’s westward
movement. Just as Americans had successfully won independence from Brit-
ain in 1776, Mexico revolted against Spain to claim statehood in 1821, occu-
pying a territory twice as large as it is today, including all or part of present-
day Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.57  Suffering internal struggles of its
own following its long war for independence, Mexico could not thwart the
arrival of Anglo settlers into the Texas territories as American expansion
continued west.58  In the ensuing Mexican-American War from 1846 to
1848, Mexico’s armed forces proved no match for the technologically and
numerically superior U.S. army, eventually leading to the annexation of mil-
lions of acres of Mexican land.59
Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-
American War in 1848, purported to preserve Mexican landowners’ rights in
the annexed land, the U.S. government’s burdensome and expensive owner-
52 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
53 See PEREA et al., supra note 49, at 191 (citing 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 1789-1897 352 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1899)) (“In leading them thus to agriculture,
to manufactures, and civilization; in bringing together their and our sentiments, and in prepar-
ing them ultimately to participate in the benefits of our Government, I trust and believe we are
acting for their greatest good.”).
54 See generally GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVI-
LIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (paperback ed., 1974).
55 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
56 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 3 (1962).
57 STEVEN W. BENDER, TIERRA Y LIBERTAD: LAND, LIBERTY, AND LATINO HOUSING 17
(2010); JOSEPH WHEELAN, INVADING MEXICO: AMERICA’S CONTINENTAL DREAM AND THE
MEXICAN WAR, 1846-1848 (2007).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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ship confirmation process rendered proof based on Mexican laws insuffi-
cient in the eyes of American adjudicators.60 When Nemecio Dominguez
attempted to evict Anglo squatters from his ranch, he presented a valid Mex-
ican title, which the California Supreme Court considered binding. The U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed, refusing to credit Dominguez’s title for his failure
to abide by Congress’s claims process: “We are unable to see any injustice
. . . in the means by which the United States undertook to separate lands in
which it held the proprietary interest from those which belonged, either equi-
tably or by a strict legal title, to private persons.”61 Like the American Indian
titles at issue in McIntosh, Mexican grants were presumptively invalid unless
specifically recognized and approved by the United States.
Like the American Indians, the Mexican Americans could not prevent
the Anglo-Protestants from breaching their borders.  Some Mexican land-
owners were dispossessed of their lands through fraud (by exploiting the
Mexicans’ unfamiliarity with the English language and contracts) or force
(by squatting on ranch land owned by Mexicans, harassing and inevitably
evicting them).62 Such tactics were particularly prevalent during the gold
rush in California, which attracted 100,000 people into the state in 1849
alone.63  By the early 1900s and continuing today, “Mexican-Americans,
through legal defeat, fraud, or financial exhaustion, had been all but wiped
out as a landholding class in the southwestern United States . . . set[ting] the
stage for a new chapter in U.S.-Mexico relations: the exploitation of low-
wage, migratory Mexican and Mexican-American labor.”64
Both physical and virtual borders played a role in early America’s west-
ward expansion, establishing an economic hierarchy along racial lines.
Whether one views this history as the product of unbridled racism or eco-
nomic opportunism (or both), it is clear that the great western march of the
1700s and 1800s was a boon to the white settlers but not to the American
Indians or the Mexican Americans. By and large, the Anglo-Protestant ma-
jority invoked borders when convenient and ignored them when they were
not. Shaping the internal boundaries of these new United States expanded
the land available to white settlers, but ultimately diminished the land availa-
ble to nonwhites. Beyond physical boundaries, laws advantageous to the ma-
jority also served as borders, perpetuating the second-class status of Mexican
Americans and American Indians dispossessed of their land.
60 BENDER, supra note 57, at 19–20.
61 Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 238, 250 (1889).
62 BENDER, supra note 57, at 22.
63 Id.
64 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, One Hundred Fifty Years of Solitude: Reflections on
the End of the History Academy’s Dominance of Scholarship on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo, 5 SW. J. OF LAW AND TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 83, 97–98 (1998).
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b. Race as a Social Construct and the “Mexican as Illegal Alien”
Stereotype
The desired “racial homogeneity”––like race itself––was a social con-
struction.  Even before the 1924 Act, America was not racially homogene-
ous, even among so-called “whites.”65 Although Anglo-Saxon culture and
politics enjoyed historical prominence, non-English whites, though initially
vilified like the Germans and Irish, eventually became part of the dominant
racial group. “White” came to include northwestern Europeans, and then
southern and eastern Europeans. Beyond the white majority, interracial rela-
tionships, both voluntary and involuntary, were long part of the American
social fabric, so much so that states passed laws outlawing miscegenation.66
Further evidence of the quirkiness of these racial classifications lay in
the seemingly arbitrary geographic distinctions the laws drew, treating cer-
tain Europeans and Asians less favorably than Mexicans, and other Western
Hemisphere residents.67 The 1924 Act establishing the permanent national
origins quota system favored the English over other Europeans, barred East
and South Asians from entry and citizenship, and exempted Western Hemi-
sphere nations, including Mexico, from these quotas.68  If these immigration
policies generally favored whites over nonwhites, why was there an exemp-
tion for presumably darker-skinned Mexican and Latin Americans?  The rea-
son is political: European Americans likely did not consider Mexicans their
equals, but neither did they believe it feasible to impose quotas upon their
southern neighbors without also restricting Canadian migration.69 Moreover,
the need for cheap Mexican labor in the southwest spurred Congress’s deci-
sion to exempt Latin America from the national origins restrictions of
1924.70
Mexicans were not, however, exempt from discriminatory treatment.
Euro-Americans’ perceived “manifest destiny” led to the annexation of
Mexican land in Texas and California—sometimes by conquest, sometimes
by intermarriage between wealthy Anglos and Mexicans—resulting in the
assimilation and homogenization of the Mexican elite.71 From 1900 to 1920,
the westward migration of Anglo farmers and the northward movement of
rural laborers fleeing the Mexican Revolution fueled the class and racial
65 KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
16-20 (paperback ed. 2004) (describing the racially exclusionary immigration laws of the early
1900s).
66 Indeed, it was not until 1967 that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down state anti-misce-
genation laws as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).  For a recent collection of essays examining the contemporary significance of
Loving, see LOVING IN A ‘POST-RACIAL’ WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX AND MARRIAGE (Ke-
vin Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor, eds., 2012) (a recent collection of essays examining the
contemporary significance of Loving).
67 See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 50 (2004).
68 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68–139, 43 Stat. 153.
69 NGAI, supra note 67, at 50–51.
70 Id. at 50.
71 See id. at 51.
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dichotomy currently existing in the agricultural southwest today, with white
property owners employing unskilled landless Mexican laborers.72
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the United States-
Mexico border was not the militarized zone we know today.73 “Before the
1920s, the Immigration Service paid little attention to the nation’s land bor-
ders because the overwhelming majority of immigrants entering the United
States landed at Ellis Island and other seaports.”74 Rather than patrolling the
southern border, immigration inspectors assumed that market demands for
Mexican labor would regulate migration; the government also described the
southern states as the Mexicans’ “natural habitat,” begrudgingly acknowl-
edging their claims to their former homeland to justify its lax enforcement
policies.75  Indeed, Mexicans were not even required to apply for admission
at ports of entry until 1919.76
But with the advent of the national origins quota system and the barred
Asiatic zone in the 1920s, deportation became the preferred remedy for im-
migration violations, eventually leading to the criminalization of border
crossings. In the 1924 Act, Congress eliminated the statute of limitations on
deportation, providing for the removal of any person who arrived without
inspection or without a valid visa after July 1, 1924.77  In 1929, Congress
added a criminal sanction to the civil deportation remedy, making it a crime
for anyone to cross the border without inspection—a misdemeanor charge
for first-time offenders, a felony conviction for recidivists.78
Despite Mexicans’ exemption from the quota rules, the 1920s emphasis
on numerical restriction, civil deportation, and criminal enforcement eventu-
ally led to the association of illegal immigration with Mexican immigration.
Due to these more stringent laws, many Europeans began hiring smugglers
to help them enter the United States from across both the Canadian and
Mexican borders.  By the late 1920s, however, ineligible Europeans from
countries like Italy and Poland found a legal alternative. They began exploit-
ing Canadian residency as an alternate means to immigrate; by residing in
Canada for five years, they were allowed to legally immigrate into the
United States. In addition, along the southern border, Anglo ranch owners
72 See id. at 51–52. For a more detailed analysis of Mexican farmworkers in California
during the period, see CAMILLE GUERIN-GONZALES, MEXICAN WORKERS AND AMERICAN
DREAMS: IMMIGRATION, REPATRIATION, AND CALIFORNIA FARM LABOR, 1900-1939 (1994).
73 The following discussion regarding the genesis of the “Mexican as illegal alien” stereo-
type first appeared in my prior article advocating the decriminalization of border crossings; it
is only slightly revised here. See Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 292–94 (2010).
74 NGAI, supra note 67, at 64; accord PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE
U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 32 (2000). See also ROBERT LEE MARIL, THE FENCE: NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER (2011);
JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON “ILLEGALS” AND THE
REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY 35 (2010).
75 NGAI, supra note 67, at 64.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 60; Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
78 Act of March 4, 1929, 45 Stat. 1551 (1929).
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often complained about the rough treatment they received from Border Pa-
trol agents.  These two developments eventually led to better, more courte-
ous treatment of Anglos and Europeans by immigration agents, while
Mexicans and other Latinos suffered the indignities of a more stringent bor-
der policy and racialized politics, fueled in part by the growing class divide
between white owners and Mexican laborers in the south.79
Though Mexicans at the time were not subject to quotas like the
Europeans or banned from naturalization and immigration like the Asians,
they became associated with illegal migration.80  As historian Mae Ngai
explains,
[A]s numerical restrictions assumed primacy in immigration pol-
icy, its enforcement aspects––inspection procedures, deportation,
the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and irregular categories of
immigration—created many thousands of illegal Mexican immi-
grants. The undocumented Mexican laborer who crossed the bor-
der to work in the burgeoning industry of commercial agriculture
thus emerged as the prototypical illegal alien.81
From 1930 to 1965, Congress vacillated between deportation and legal-
ization as it attempted to craft policies that met the needs of the U.S. agricul-
ture industry, provided sufficient protection for exploited Mexican workers,
and gave coherence to the deportation system it had created.82 Perhaps the
symbiotic relationship between United States employers and Mexican
farmworkers may best be illustrated by the recorded numbers at the end of
the Bracero program, a migrant labor initiative begun in the 1950s.83 Up to
1964, the number of workers almost equaled the number of deportees, at
close to five million each.84
This history teaches that the boundaries of belonging are never fixed,
but are subject to transgression, adjustment, and revision, depending on the
vagaries of politics, economics, and perception, not unlike how the physical
frontiers of the United States were simultaneously pushed westward while
contained eastward through restrictive immigration policy.
79 NGAI, supra note 67, at 64–70.
80 Id. at 71 (“It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal immigration
because, unlike Europeans, they were not subject to numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics,
they were not excluded as racially ineligible to citizenship.”). For a compelling argument
against contemporary immigrant race profiling, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000).
81 NGAI, supra note 67, at 71.
82 See DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 214–24 (2007) (describing deportation of
Mexicans from 1930-1965).
83 Id. at 224.
84 Id.
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III. THE OPTIMIST’S ALTERNATIVE: “AMERICA THE INCLUSIVE”
National boundaries, though sometimes physical, have always been a
legal fiction, established and maintained by elites through the mechanism of
state power.  Yet, those same elites have also tested the limits of those bor-
ders, sometimes transgressing them through conquest, sometimes expanding
them through purchase, always with the view of augmenting their wealth
and power. But less powerful inhabitants, who may have first occupied the
land or had migrated to it later (whether freely or by force), were displaced
by the elites, either directly or through their loss of land (like the American
Indians and Mexicans). Externally, although immigration from Europe and
Asia was initially open, the new Republic worried about foreign influences,
first enacting limits on movement into the individual states, and then passing
qualitative and quantitative restrictions on immigration into the United
States. Evincing the same prejudices that buttressed America’s westward ex-
pansion, early federal immigration policy severely restricted southern and
eastern European migration while effectively outlawing newcomers from
Asia. Along with racial and ethnic stereotypes, negative views based on pov-
erty, disability, ideology, and perceived criminality also influenced early im-
migration law, further widening the gulf between immigrant and citizen.
Following on the heels of the United States’ resurgence as the dominant
world power after the Second World War, the mid-twentieth century saw a
momentous change in American racial politics, leading to a corresponding
relaxation of racial restrictions within immigration policy.  It’s no surprise
that this defining period in American history produced the iconic Brown v.
Board of Education85 decision in the Supreme Court, as well as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, which repealed the national origins quota system.86
Though met with great resistance as perhaps befits the societal upheaval of
this period, America began a slow march toward greater racial and class
equality, widening opportunities for citizens of color domestically while lift-
ing the immigration barriers wrought by the national origins quota system on
immigrants of color.87 Alas, the pendulum appears to have swung back yet
again: comprehensive immigration reform appears to be a blip on the legisla-
tive horizon while undocumented migration has increasingly occupied the
agendas of state and local governments.
Notwithstanding our history and current politics, might there be a via-
ble counter-narrative to the prevailing view?  Because our Constitution dis-
tinguishes between the citizen and the noncitizen, alienage becomes an easy
demarcation line, one to which public policymakers will default. Social psy-
chology supports this idea, which might be termed, “discrimination by de-
85  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86 Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996).
87 Id. at 301–03.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\16\HLA105.txt unknown Seq: 19 22-MAY-13 14:07
2013] Our Illegal Founders 165
fault.”88 Human nature causes us to prefer the familiar, and to the extent
noncitizens are easily identifiable as outsiders under the law, that designa-
tion then acquires more than just a legal meaning; over time, it becomes
associated with other undesirable traits––such as criminality, inscrutability,
unassimilability––notwithstanding a lack of data to support these assump-
tions.89 Furthermore, should alienage be associated with other outsider char-
acteristics such as minority race or religion, these characteristics become
proxies for non-citizenship, lending credence to fears about racial profiling
of Latinos that inevitably attend anti-immigration statutes such as Arizona’s
“trespass” law.90
Moreover, part of the debate over how one perceives undocumented
migrants might be explained by whether immigrants are viewed in the aggre-
gate or as individuals.91  If one sees immigrants as part of an invasion of a
great number of foreigners whose values differ from Americans’, then it be-
comes easy to favor the rule of law as a paramount principle justifying ex-
clusion. If, however, one sees through our immigration laws to the
individuals and families making their way to America in order to provide
better opportunities for themselves, one might be more willing to view the
border crossing as a minor transgression, if one at all, not unlike how most
Americans today have forgotten George Washington’s and Ethan Allen’s ille-
gal border crossing activities before the U.S. was founded.  Put another way,
when we view immigrants as “illegal aliens,” we’re more likely to lump
them with thieves; when we see them as pioneers struggling to better their
lives, we’re no more worried about them than we would be about a jaywalker
in Manhattan.
What, then, is the way forward? Lessons from the Founding suggest
that the United States should remove the stigma that attends undocumented
border crossings just as it has excused the transgressions of patriots like
Washington and Allen.  Indeed, the United States Constitution aspires to
such egalitarianism.  While it clearly preserves our sovereignty by differenti-
ating citizens from others, the Constitution also requires that all “per-
sons”—not just citizens—be afforded due process and equal treatment
under the law.
The alternative, then, is to reaffirm inclusion, not exclusion, as a core
principle of post-Civil War America.  Perhaps best embodied in the path-
88 See, e.g., LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT 8–9 (2006) (noting that discrimi-
nation is more the process of default actions that perpetuate the status quo racial order).
89 See, e.g., LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS,
AND THE NATION 2-3 (2008) (“The contemporary Latino Threat Narrative has its antecedents
in U.S. history: the German language threat, the Catholic threat, the Chinese and Japanese
immigration threats, and the southern and eastern European threat . . . . Each [discourse] was
pervasive and defined ‘truths’ about the threats posed by immigrants that, in hindsight, were
unjustified or never materialized in the long run of history.”).
90 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, Arizona S.B. 1070 (2010).
91 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Portrait of the Undocumented Immigrant, 44 GA. L.
REV. 65, 70–72 (2009) (arguing that one’s perception of proper immigration policy depends in
part on whether one views migrants as individuals needing help or as a mass of undifferenti-
ated, undocumented persons who are inherently lawbreakers).
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breaking school desegregation decision of Brown v. Board of Education,92
this “integrationist” alternative asserts that America is a land of opportunity
for everyone who shares its core values, and therefore, the border should not
be an obstacle to those who are willing to work hard to succeed and contrib-
ute to our society. Such a principle suggests a policy more welcoming of
foreign nationals, only excluding those who are true threats to national
security.
Embracing integration makes immigration easier for the vast majority
of migrants who aspire to make the U.S. their home while simultaneously
focusing scarce enforcement resources on the few true un-
desirables––criminals and terrorists––who present threats to the nation.93  As
applied to undocumented migrants, Brown’s commitment to equality was ex-
tended to children without papers, when the Supreme Court held in Plyler v.
Doe that Texas must afford such a vulnerable population the opportunity to
attend primary and secondary public schools regardless of their status.94  In
sum, Brown and Plyler reflect a commitment to what I’ve termed “integra-
tive egalitarianism,” the idea that “governmental programs . . . designed to
overcome arbitrary inequalities stemming from accidents of birth are a
worthwhile investment in society’s future.”95
At the federal level, examples of “integrative egalitarianism” have in-
cluded comprehensive immigration reform bills that seek a pathway to citi-
zenship for many of the productive, upstanding undocumented migrants who
want to become part of and contribute to the American dream.96 Other high-
lights include the otherwise conservative Supreme Court’s decisions to rec-
ognize a minimum quantum of rights all persons enjoy, including the right
not to be indefinitely detained97 and the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.98 Some states and localities, like New Haven, Connecticut, have em-
braced the idea of providing sanctuary to the undocumented, issuing local ID
cards to all its residents so that they become invested in their community.99
92 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES 196–199 (2007) (developing the
idea of embracing immigrant integration).
94 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
95 Victor C. Romero, Immigrant Education and the Promise of Integrative Egalitarianism,
2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (coining the term “integrative egalitarianism”).
96 For example, Rep. Luis Gutierrez introduced a comprehensive immigration bill in 2009
that would have found a workable pathway to citizenship for many undocumented persons.
See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, New Immigration Bill is Introduced in House, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2009, at A28 (N.Y. ed.), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/politics/
16immig.html.
97 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371
(2005).
98 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that criminal defense attor-
neys must advise noncitizens of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea).
99 See Community Services Administration: New Haven Residents, CITY OF NEW HAVEN,
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/csa/newhavenresidents/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). The Los
Angeles City Council overwhelmingly approved a plan to issue ID cards to the undocumented.
See Kathleen Miles, ID Cards for Undocumented in LA Approved by Council, HUFFINGTON
POST ON-LINE, Nov. 9, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/09/id-
cards-undocumented-immigrants-la_n_2102504.html.
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Similarly, New Mexico and Washington continue to issue state driver li-
censes to all residents, including undocumented migrants, reckoning that en-
suring safety on the roads requires a universal approach.100  Additionally,
several states have extended in-state tuition benefits to undocumented high
school graduates, permitting them to pursue their dreams of higher
education.101
* * *
Following the Civil War, the U.S. Constitution was amended to provide
due process and equal protection for all persons, not just citizens. Liberated
from their segregationist shackles by the Supreme Court in the Brown deci-
sion, the Fourteenth Amendment’s twin guarantees appeal to the better an-
gels of our nature, reminding us of a basic human truth—the equal dignity of
all persons—that must be safeguarded in an increasingly complex and inter-
connected world.  There is no reason why immigration policy should be ex-
empt from the ideal of integrative egalitarianism. What was good enough for
our illegal founders should be good enough for our undocumented brethren
today.
100 See How to Get a New Mexico Driver License, NEW MEXICO MOTOR VEHICLE DIVI-
SION ONLINE, http://www.mvd.newmexico.gov/Drivers/Licensing/Pages/How-to-get-a-New-
Mexico-Driver-License.aspx  (last visited July 16, 2012); Getting a License, WASHINGTON
STATE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/gettingalicense.html
(last visited July 16, 2012).
101 See MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND 64–69 (2012) (dis-
cussing the development of in-state tuition laws benefiting undocumented students).
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